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This article focuses on the evaluation of transfer from Track Two diplomacy to negotiations and 
 policymaking by examining four Track Two initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians over the issues of 
water and Jerusalem. The article first discusses the transfer process for the water and Jerusalem cases and 
then presents lessons drawn from the comparative study. The comparative assessment reveals similarities 
concerning transfer in terms of what the contributions of Track Two are to the process of negotiations, 
which transfer strategies are used, and what conditions are necessary to make a contribution to the out-
come. Initiatives in both cases employ primarily the strategy of working with influential people and they 
are more successful in impacting the process of negotiations rather than the outcome. Their contribution 
to the process of negotiations shows regularities in the types of learning acquired and used. Successful 
transfer to outcome is observed in one occasion when transfer strategies were implemented effectively, the 
negotiators were open to outside information, and there was political willingness. Asymmetrical transfer 
of people, and of ideas, from Track Two initiatives to negotiations was a barrier to effective transfer.
Introduction
Track Two diplomacy has increasingly 
been recognized as a third-party interven-
tion method to deal with intractable con-
flicts because of its ambition to address the 
underlying causes of conflicts and its aim to 
improve relations between the adversaries. 
In this article, the term Track Two diplomacy 
is used to refer to a variety of nongovern-
mental and unofficial forms of conflict reso-
lution activities between the representatives 
of adver sarial groups that aim at de- escalating 
conflict, improving  communication and 
 understanding between the parties, and devel-
oping new ideas to be used in the official 
peace processes (Montville, 1995).
The range of goals and practices in Track 
Two diplomacy vary. Yet, two main assump-
tions appear as common denominators of 
Track Two initiatives. The first is the under-
lying belief that contact and interactions 
between the members of adversarial groups 
in an unofficial and friendly setting, often 
with the help of a third party, help improve 
relations and generate a joint understand-
ing of the conflict. The second assumption 
is that the improved relations and jointly 
formulated ideas are transferred and incorpo-
rated into the society and/or the official poli-
cymaking processes, thus, having an impact 
at a larger scale.
Although the number of Track Two work-
shops increased in the last couple of decades, 
the effectiveness of these efforts based on the 
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above-mentioned  assumptions has hardly 
been evaluated, except in  individual acco-
unts recorded by practitioners. Scholars 
like d’Estree et al. (2001), Fisher (1997), 
and Rouhana (2000) called attention to the 
evaluation of problem-solving workshops as 
a necessity in order to improve and increase 
the credibility of the practice. Rouhana 
(2000) suggested that evaluation of problem-
solving workshops should be undertaken at 
two different levels: (1) evaluation of the 
micro-objectives (the impact of the work-
shop activities on the immediate partici-
pants), and (2) evaluation of the macro-goals 
(the impact of workshops on the conflict 
dynamics at large).
This study addresses the second level by 
focusing on the evaluation of transfer from 
Track Two diplomacy to the macro level 
and elaborates how this process has worked 
in four Israeli–Palestinian problem-solving 
workshops that are examined. The article first 
overviews the existing literature on transfer, 
then reports the transfer process in the water 
and Jerusalem cases, and finally presents 
some lessons drawn from the comparative 
case study of the four Track Two initiatives.
While the water conflict is about shar-
ing the scarce water resources in the region 
without jeopardizing the quality of these 
resources, the Jerusalem conflict is about 
sovereignty over the city and surroundings. 
In each of the two issue areas, two Track 
Two initiatives are examined.
The two initiatives concerning water were 
 carried out by the Israel/Palestine  Center for 
Research and Information (IPCRI initiative) 
and by the Truman Institute and  Palestine 
 Consultancy Group (Truman-PCG initiative). 
The initiatives on Jerusalem were undertaken 
by the Economic Cooperation Foundation 
and the Arab Studies Society (ECF-ASS ini-
tiative) and by the Jerusalem Institute for 
Israel Studies and the Inter national Peace 
and  Cooperation Center (JI-IPCC initiative). 
All of these  initiatives took place at the 
 pre- negotiation stage (before the Oslo II and/
or the final status  negotiations) and involved 
mid-to-high-level participants. Although the 
two issues seem to be very  different in nature – 
one extremely politically charged, the other 
relatively more technical – an important find-
ing of the comparative analysis is that in terms 
of transfer effects and outcomes, strategies of 
transfer, and indeed for the most part success 
in transfer, the Track Two initiatives have 
been remarkably  similar.
Evaluation of Track Two Diplomacy 
and Transfer
In recent studies evaluating micro-objectives, 
Maoz (2000), Ohanyan & Lewis (2005), and 
Malhotra & Liyanage (2005) evaluated work-
shops with youth to assess whether contact 
between the members of adversarial groups 
resulted in improved relations in the short or 
long term. Despite the increase in the number 
of evaluations focusing on the micro-objec-
tives, systematic research is still lacking espe-
cially on the evaluation of micro-objectives in 
workshops held with elites and policymakers, 
and on the evaluation of the link between the 
micro-objectives and the macro-goals, known 
as the transfer effects of the workshops.
The early practitioners of Track Two 
diplomacy assumed that the innovative anal-
ysis of conflicts and positive changes in the 
attitudes in the Track Two meetings later on 
transfer to the official policymaking auto-
matically. However, this idea was simplis-
tic and inadequate to help understand the 
processes that take place in and between the 
micro and the macro levels.
Several attempts have been undertaken by 
Fisher (1997), Kelman (1995), and Mitchell 
(1981, 1993) to elaborate the simple intu-
ition of early practitioners about transfer. 
Fisher (1997: 202–204) has suggested that 
the closer the Track Two participants are to 
the decisionmakers, the more likely it is that 
transfer to Track One will be direct; the more 
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negotiations and official domain of decision 
and policymaking (Fisher, 2005; Kelman, 
1995; Mitchell, 1981, 1993) is what will be 
referred to as upwards transfer in this article 
(for other types, see Cuhadar, 2004).
The findings discussed in this article con-
cern upwards transfer. The research questions 
are posed specifically for pre-negotiation type 
Track Two initiatives that were undertaken 
with mid-to-high-level participants. Figure 1 
shows the stage of conflict de-escalation and 
level of participants selected as the focus of 
this research. Depending on the location 
on this chart, the goals and methods articu-
lated for micro- and macro-level changes are 
expected to vary as well. For example, the goals 
and methods, as well as the transfer strategies, 
used for workshops with  semi-official people 
aiming at assisting official negotiations are 
different from workshops that gather univer-
sity students from the grassroots level at the 
post-conflict peacebuilding stage.
Method
Structured-focused comparative case study 
method was used to systematically  examine the 
four cases in this study (see George &  Bennett, 
2005). The cases are described below.
Data were collected through 60  interviews 
carried out between 2002 and 2004 with the 
participants and organizers of the workshops, 
and with Israeli, Palestinian and  American 
 policymakers and negotiators involved in 
water and Jerusalem issues. Two separate 
 interview protocols were designed: one for 
the participants and organizers and the 
other for the negotiators and  policymakers. 
The  protocol for the participants included 
 questions in four categories: relations with 
the others, types of learning in the workshops, 
transfer strategies, and the implementation 
of the transfer  strategies. The population of 
 participants interviewed for each initiative 
was determined with the help of  organizers 
and snowball sampling. Interviews were 
distant they are from the decisionmakers, the 
more likely it is that transfer will be indirect.
Mitchell (1981) and Kelman (1995) 
emphasized the trade-off between engaging 
participants closely connected to the deci-
sionmakers and those that are not. They have 
argued that the closer the participants are to 
the decisionmakers, the more likely it is that 
they will be politically conformist and resis-
tant to change. The further away they are 
from official circles, the more likely that they 
will be flexible. Mitchell, in addition, sug-
gested that the closer and more conformist 
they are, the more likely it is that transfer will 
be direct; and the further and more flexible 
they are, the more innovative their recom-
mendations will be, but the less likely that 
there will be direct transfer to Track One.
Recent studies by d’Estree et al. (2001) 
suggested indicators to assess Track Two 
diplomacy at three levels: the micro level 
(relational and cognitive changes), the link 
between the micro level and the macro level 
(foundations for transfer), and the macro 
level (foundations for outcome). Yet, these 
indicators were not tested empirically and 
were not specified for activities that take 
place at a specific stage of a conflict with a 
certain level of people. Overall, attempts so 
far to elaborate the simple intuition about 
Track Two remained inadequate in account-
ing for the complexities of the processes that 
take place at both the micro and the macro 
levels, and between these two levels, and have 
hardly been evaluated against empirical data.
Transfer is usually defined as ‘how effects 
(e.g. attitudinal changes, new realizations) 
and outcomes (e.g. frameworks for negotia-
tion) are moved from the unofficial interven-
tions to the official domain of decision and 
policy making’ (Fisher, 2005: 3). This article 
defines transfer in a similar manner but, for 
precision, adds three directions: upwards, 
downwards, and lateral. The traditional 
emphasis in the literature on the transfer 
of workshop effects and outcomes to the 
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on d’Estree et al. (2001). Data concerning 
these categories were coded following this 
codebook and the frequency of each theme 
in each interview was reported.1
Cases
All Track Two cases were selected accord-
ing to the theoretical focus of this research 
as shown in Figure 1. The initiatives aimed 
at producing jointly formulated outcomes to 
be publicized and to assist the negotiations, 
as well as trying to build relationships among 
their participants as a by-product. In this 
structured-focused comparative case study, 
the initiatives selected were controlled for the 
following variables: (1) time frame in which 
the initiatives took place (between 1991 and 
2000); (2) number of parties in the conflict 
(bilateral issues that included only Israelis 
and Palestinians); (3) stage of the conflict 
(before and in-between the negotiations); 
(4) level of participants (all were undertaken 
 carried out with 80–90% of the core group 
members for the two water initiatives and at 
least 70% of the core group members for the 
Jerusalem initiatives.
The second protocol aimed at under-
standing the level of information and involve-
ment of the policymakers and negotiators 
in the concerned Track Two initiatives and 
asking about the implementation of the 
transfer strategies. The policymakers and 
negotiators interviewed on the Palestinian 
and Israeli sides were from institutions such 
as the Israeli Water Commissioner’s Office, 
Joint Water Committee, and members of the 
negotiation teams.
When available, documentary data such 
as meeting minutes, joint statements, annual 
reports, and published interviews with par-
ticipants were also used.
The data were coded for content with 
the help of a software program. The content 
analysis used a combination of deductive and 
inductive coding. For the deductive part, 
a codebook was created based on the themes 
suggested in the literature, especially based 




























Focus of this research
Types of participants, degree of officiality
De-escalation stages
* This figure builds on levels of peacebuilding in Lederach (1997: 39).
1 Tables on frequency distributions are available in  Cuhadar 
(2004). This article reports only general tendencies.
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 conflict: the situation of the shared  Mountain 
 Aquifer, a main source of fresh water for 
both Israelis and Palestinians. The aim 
of the initiative was to conduct policy-
 oriented dialogue on the management of the 
aquifer in order to contribute to the final 
 status negotiations. The initiative brought 
together a group of influential policy people 
working on water, as well as academics and 
hydrologists from both sides. The initiative 
was funded by the International Develop-
ment and Research Center and the CRB 
Foundation and took place between 1994 
and 2002. Throughout this time, most of 
the group participants remained the same 
(see Feitelson & Haddad, 1995, 2000, for 
more information).
The ECF-ASS initiatives dealt mostly 
with the functional-technical, but also with 
the political aspects of the Jerusalem issue. 
ECF began working on final status issues 
after the signing of the Oslo agreements 
and within the framework of the Beilin-Abu 
Mazen backchannel talks. With these gen-
eral political frameworks in the background, 
ECF began focusing on the Jerusalem ques-
tion and started to work with ASS under 
Faisal Husseini’s leadership. The goal was to 
bring expertise into the dialogue, to explore 
new ideas and discuss their feasibility, and to 
disseminate these ideas to the decisionmak-
ers. An additional goal on the Palestinian 
side was to prepare the Palestinians for the 
negotiations by building their capacity.
The ECF-ASS initiative on Jerusalem con-
tinued in three tracks with some overlapping 
people in each. ‘Planning Jerusalem in Peace’, 
which focused on the municipal aspects of 
the conflict, was carried out with a group of 
about eight people from each side, consisting 
of professionals and experts on the city. The 
later initiatives were the London and Italian 
tracks, which focused on legal and political 
issues such as sovereignty and were held in 
the round-table format with a mixed group 
of professionals and politicians.
with  professional people); (5) duration of the 
 initiatives (all lasted for at least three years); 
and (6) format of the  process followed. They 
were all  policy-oriented problem-solving 
workshops attended by issue experts and 
 politically connected people. This was the 
case not only for water workshops, but also for 
Jerusalem workshops which included experts 
on religious affairs, city planners,  lawyers, etc. 
On the other hand, the Track Two initiatives 
examined varied in terms of the nature of the 
dispute (water vs.  Jerusalem).
The IPCRI water initiative was founded in 
the early 1990s with the aim of  providing a 
forum for Israeli and Palestinian water experts 
to engage in problem-solving and to help 
them explore ideas, options, and  solutions 
that would meet the interests of both parties.
IPCRI created two parallel projects on 
water. The first was round tables between 
Israeli and Palestinian water professionals. 
The goal of the meetings was to get water 
experts from both sides of the conflict 
acquainted with each other, engage them 
in a dialogue over water issues, and explore 
each other’s positions and interests. The 
number of participants changed from one 
meeting to another, but the size of the group 
grew in time from single digits in the early 
1990s to more than 20 in the mid-1990s. 
The meetings continued regularly until the 
late 1990s.
The parallel project to the round tables, 
which took place with the participation of 
four of the veteran round-table participants, 
was a small Israeli–Palestinian working 
group. The group included a Palestinian and 
an Israeli academic, an Israeli water consul-
tant, and a Palestinian water expert. These 
group members met frequently in order to 
formulate a regional water master plan that 
could form the basis for some policy recom-
mendations (see Assaf et al., 1993, for more 
information).
The Truman-PCG initiative  targeted 
one of the thorniest issues in the water 
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For instance, the JI-IPCC project generated 
insights as to how urban life (e.g. improving 
the urban economy, management of cultural 
and religious sites, municipal borders) in 
Jerusalem can be improved in a shared city. 
The ECF-ASS initiative promoted ideas 
related to different types of sovereignty and 
their practical implementation, and about 
how to maintain Jerusalem as an ‘open city’.
The contributions of Track Two ini-
tiatives to the negotiations in the case of 
Jerusalem were limited to the process of nego-
tiations. These contributions began during 
the preparation for the Camp David talks, 
despite important barriers to effectiveness, 
but intensified and improved as the negotia-
tions evolved between Camp David in sum-
mer 2000 and Taba in January 2001. A key 
contribution to the process was when detailed 
maps and data generated in the  Jerusalem 
initiatives were used by the policymakers 
and negotiators on both sides, especially dur-
ing the talks between Camp David and Taba 
when the two sides delved into the details of 
the Jerusalem issue. Until after Camp David, 
however, owing to political unwillingness 
from both sides’ leaderships, existence of 
competing Track Two channels, and asym-
metrical transfer of people and ideas, con-
tributions to the process could not become 
effective and did not have much input into 
the political process.
During the preparation phase, on the 
Israeli side Prime Minister Ehud Barak refused 
to deal with Jerusalem officially until the 
 negotiations began. He did not authorize his 
negotiators to prepare materials and policy 
papers that could be used for the negotiations. 
Track Two  initiatives filled this vacuum, both 
before and during the Camp David negotiations, 
through transfer of maps and policy papers from 
the JI and the ECF to Israeli negotiators Oded 
Eran, Gilead Sher, and Shlomo Ben Ami, and 
also to the US peace team. The JI conveyed their 
understanding about what they thought was the 
‘backbone of the Palestinian line’, in meetings 
especially with Oded Eran, but they did not 
The JI initiated Israeli–Palestinian work-
shops with professionals in 1995, first with 
the ASS. After 1998, these joint activities 
continued with a new Palestinian NGO 
called IPCC. The joint activities of JI and 
IPCC were funded by the Olaf Palme Insti-
tute until 2000, with the goal of conducting 
 policy-oriented dialogue between profession-
als and experts on Jerusalem. Among these 
professionals were urban planners, economists, 
lawyers, diplomats, and sociologists. The ini-
tiative adopted a functionalist approach focus-
ing on the technical and municipal problems 
of Jerusalem that required cooperation, rather 
than the political aspects. The goal of the ini-
tiative was to produce and promote ideas that 
would ‘improve the quality of life in the city 
for both parties’ (Jerusalem Institute for Israel 
Studies, 2002: 28–29).
Within the framework of this initia-
tive, a workshop was held in Sweden each 
year with the larger group for about five 
days. The group consisted of approximately 
eight professionals on each side. In between 
these workshops, smaller working groups 
of  Palestinian and Israeli professionals 
 continued their work.
Outcomes of the Transfer Process
Transfer outcomes in the upwards direction 
should be viewed in two categories: transfer 
from Track Two initiatives to the official 
process and to the outcome. While the former 
means that the effects and outcomes  generated 
in the initiatives made a contribution to the 
process of decisionmaking and negotiations, 
the latter refers to situations in which the 
Track Two initiatives managed to contrib-
ute to the negotiation outcome. This section 
 discusses transfer in these two categories for 
Jerusalem and water cases separately and the 
next section presents a comparative analysis.
Transfer from Track Two in Jerusalem
For Jerusalem, both Track Two initiatives 
came up with innovative ideas and insights. 
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During this stage, one barrier to the  effective 
transfer of ideas and proposals from the 
Track Two initiatives was competing politi-
cal  channels. For example, Faisal Husseini 
from the ASS, who held the PLO’s  Jerusalem 
portfolio, initially played an active role in the 
preparatory talks held between Yaser Abed 
Rabbo/Saeb Erakat and Oded Eran. He 
appointed a team from the Orient House to 
do preparatory work for negotiating about 
Jerusalem (Klein, 2003: 50). The team 
included people who attended the Track 
Two initiatives with the JI and ECF through 
ASS. However, these talks were running 
parallel to other back-channel talks between 
Abu Ala and Shlomo Ben Ami/Gilead Sher 
(Ross, 2004: 603). Palestinian negotiators, 
other than Arafat, initially were not aware of 
the existence of another channel with Israe-
lis. Although the Rabbo-Erakat and Oded 
Eran channel was open to the transfer of the 
work done in the ASS Track Two, it was 
in the parallel back-channel that  Jerusalem 
was brought up and discussed in May 2000 
(Ross, 2004). Yet, this channel did not 
involve Husseini or the professional group at 
the ASS, or anyone from the NAD, which 
was the national-level Palestinian organiza-
tion headed by Abu Mazen doing prepara-
tory work on final status issues, including 
Jerusalem. The barrier of competing chan-
nels was mentioned by a Palestinian member 
of the NSU as follows:
X individual was negotiating with Y and had 
clever ideas but hadn’t shared it with anybody 
else. So, when there was some opportunity for 
direct negotiation on the matter, there was 
nobody to carry out the information forward 
because this person had not shared it and 
because this person was expecting to be in the 
negotiations. The talks had to have him .… 
But often somebody was left out. So, the 
information flow did not take place.
Therefore, because of competing channels 
and lack of access of key influential people to 
all channels, Track Two effects and outcomes 
were not transferred to the Palestinian nego-
tiators effectively at the preparatory stage and 
necessarily present an integrative outcome that 
is jointly agreed upon in Track Two meetings. 
All the options presented by the JI were based 
on a physically undivided city (Klein, 2003: 52). 
The second option that the JI highlighted was 
similar to the Israeli offer made in the Camp 
David negotiations, which emphasized func-
tional autonomy for Palestinians under Israeli 
sovereignty, limited exchange of territory at the 
edges of the city, symbolic official presence for 
Palestinians in Jerusalem, special status in the 
Old City, and continuation of the status quo in 
the Haram/Temple Mount (Klein, 2003: 52).
On the Palestinian side too, within the 
existing lack of political willingness, Track 
Two initiatives filled a vacuum. Maps, data, 
and policy papers concerning the urban and 
municipal issues became important contribu-
tions. A Palestinian participant of the ECF-
ASS initiatives who served in the negotiation 
team argued:
We got information that we didn’t have, like 
detailed maps on Jerusalem and settlements, 
through the second track. We learned what 
was happening on the ground, statistics, 
etc. … For me, it was a great benefit at Camp 
David because Clinton and even the Israeli 
politicians recognized that technically we were 
well prepared. We had materials ready for 
everything they talked about .… This is the 
accumulation that came through the second 
track.
Despite the well-prepared technical 
 people in the negotiations, the input by 
Track Two could not become sufficiently 
 effective, owing to political problems. The 
lack of effectiveness in benefiting from the 
Track Two initiatives was mentioned by 
people from the  Palestinian Negotiation 
Support Unit (NSU), under the Negotia-
tion Affairs Department (NAD), and also 
by  Palestinian Track Two participants such as 
the  following:
I was frustrated with the Palestinian system. 
I didn’t feel that there was enough dissemi-
nation of information on our side where one 
address would work and you would bring the 
results to that address.
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they provide proposals  complementing those 
suggested for other connected issues such as 
security, borders, and settlements.2
Furthermore, the transfer of people and 
proposals from Track Two meetings to the 
official negotiations was asymmetrical dur-
ing the Camp David summit. The Israeli 
organizers of the Track Two initiatives 
were more directly connected to the nego-
tiators than their Palestinian counterparts. 
While there were people affiliated with the 
JI and the ECF at the negotiations, this was 
not the case for the Palestinian side, espe-
cially after Faisal Husseini was left out. In 
addition, Barak and Arafat refrained from 
authorizing their negotiators on the issue 
of Jerusalem (Ross, 2004; Malley & Agha, 
2001). Thus, there was not sufficient close-
ness or direct links to the decisionmakers. 
After the Camp David summit, until the 
announcement of the Clinton parameters in 
December and Taba negotiations in  January, 
interactions between Track Two people and 
officials became more systematic, frequent, 
and institutionalized. For example, an advisory 
‘peace team’ was established at the Israeli Prime 
Minister’s office which included people who 
were involved in the ECF and JI initiatives. 
These people had direct exchange with nego-
tiator Gilead Sher and continued to provide 
information, maps, and  solutions concerning 
Jerusalem until the Taba  negotiations.
On the Palestinian side too, during this 
period, Track Two participants had more  access 
to their negotiators. After the  summit, Pales-
tinian officials became more open to Track 
Two and coordination between the Ministry 
of Planning and International Co operation, 
Orient House, and NSU improved. For exam-
ple, one of the ideas – land swaps for East 
Jerusalem settlements – that was first sug-
gested in an ECF-ASS meeting was taken 
by the Palestinian  negotiators and passed 
during the Camp David talks. Still, maps and 
data found their way to the technical people, 
although in a non-systematic manner.
Maps and data were also the kind of input 
that was sought by the negotiators and by the 
US peace team at Camp David, as the head 
of the team Dennis Ross articulated:
So much of what was being discussed on 
 Jerusalem got into the nitty gritty of life 
there: How you would handle municipal 
powers, how you would deal with the daily 
life of the city, how you would create equal 
access to all religious sites. So, I was aware [of 
the initiatives] and generally would read their 
accounts. They were providing raw material, 
data on what life is really like neighborhood 
by neighborhood, which was something that 
we had to contend with. That was not really 
available to us. So, what they were doing 
provided it.
During the Camp David summit, the dis-
cussion on Jerusalem never got to a detailed 
level (Ross, 2004: 657). It reached this level 
only during the negotiations following 
Camp David. Still, towards the end of the 
summit, the US peace team brought to the 
table several ideas related to sovereignty over 
the Old City and Jerusalem as they were fed 
constantly by the ECF. Another member of 
the US peace team mentions:
I was hoping that they [ideas/proposals from 
Track Two initiatives] would be more useful 
than they ended up being. We tried them out 
in Camp David. We were hoping that both 
sides would accept them. Ended up that we 
were not able to forge a compromise based on 
those ideas.
Neither the ideas sent through the faxes 
nor the transfer of key Israeli people from 
the Track Two meetings to the negotiations 
was effective in bridging the differences and 
influencing the negotiation outcome. The 
proposals coming from the organizers of the 
Track Two initiatives did not always reflect a 
jointly agreed upon and complete understand-
ing that could bridge the gap between the 
Israeli and Palestinian positions. Neither did 
2 Interview with assistant to Gilead Sher, Tel Aviv, 
 September 2003.
Esra  Cuhadar  T R A C K  T W O  D I P L O M A C Y 649
of shared aquifers inspired the related article 
in the 1995 Oslo agreement and the opera-
tionalization of the Joint Water Committee 
(JWC), a by-product of that agreement.
The transfer to outcome occurred, in this 
case, because the idea of joint management 
was advocated symmetrically in the negotia-
tions by both sides, even though the connec-
tion to the negotiations on the Palestinian 
side was more direct than on the Israeli side. 
However, this outcome was achieved not 
only because the idea of joint management 
was transferred symmetrically by key partici-
pants, but also because of openness to infor-
mation and of political willingness within the 
Palestinian and Israeli negotiation teams.
The members of the official negotiation 
teams who were affiliated with the Truman-
PCG initiative were all water experts and 
technical people. There were more direct 
mechanisms of transfer on the Palestinian 
side because two of the Palestinians from the 
initiative were in the negotiation team. Israeli 
members of the initiative did not directly take 
part in the official negotiations, but the initia-
tive had included an influential Israeli water 
expert, who was an ex-deputy water commis-
sioner, with close contacts within the Israeli 
negotiation team and water establishment. 
The initiative also had contacts with one of 
the Israeli technical experts, Uri Shamir, in 
the negotiation team. So, the Israeli members 
of the initiative had access to the negotiators 
via intermediaries. Shamir was well informed 
about the initiative outcomes and was in 
favor of the idea of joint management, say-
ing: ‘since water knows no boundaries, joint 
management makes good sense and is prob-
ably inevitable’ (Rouyer, 2000: 195).
The internal dynamics of the negotiations 
in terms of openness to information within the 
Israeli team and political willingness were at 
least as important as the efforts of the Truman-
PCG participants in this  transfer to outcome. 
Israeli position on the issue of joint manage-
ment and water rights evolved between the 
back onto Track Two for further  exploration.3 
This idea was accepted by both sides in the 
Taba  negotiations (Cingoli, 2001;  Hassassian, 
2001 on land swaps).
Yet, during this time, the focus continued 
to be primarily on functional and municipal 
matters. The negotiators made progress on 
these issues and discussed them in a detailed 
manner, as recommended by the Track Two 
initiatives. However, the religious aspects of 
Jerusalem remained the core of the problem 
and yet very few concrete ideas were offered 
in the Track Two initiatives on these, with 
the exception of the establishment of a 
 Jerusalem Religious Council to supervise 
all the religious matters (Cingoli, 2001: 12; 
 Hassassian, 2001).
In short, the contributions of Track Two 
to negotiations were limited to input into the 
negotiation process only, mostly on the func-
tional aspects of the Jerusalem question. The 
initiatives involved influential people who 
had direct access to negotiations and to nego-
tiators. However, such direct links and the 
ideas proposed were not adequate to recon-
cile the differences between the  parties.
Transfer from Track Two in Water
Many innovative ideas and insights were also 
generated in Track Two meetings on water. 
For example, IPCRI meetings elaborated 
upon the ‘minimum water requirement’ and 
drafted a ‘regional water master plan’ (Assaf 
et al., 1993). Likewise the Truman-PCG 
project came up with various types of joint 
management structures for the shared aqui-
fers that would meet both Israeli and Pal-
estinian needs (Feitelson & Haddad, 1995, 
2000). While transfer of ideas and insights 
was limited to only the process in the  Jerusalem 
case, in the water case there was transfer to 
both process and outcome. The Truman-PCG 
 initiative’s work on the joint  management 
3 Interview with a Palestinian negotiator, Ramallah, 
 September 2003.
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the negotiation team, Tsur reached an agree-
ment with Ahmed Qureia on water with the 
approval of both Peres and Rabin.
After the second Oslo negotiations, the 
contributions of the Truman-PCG initia-
tive to the process continued, although in 
a diminished way, as one of the Palestinian 
participants took on a senior position as the 
head of the Palestinian technical commit-
tees at the JWC. The JWC, established with 
the Oslo II agreement, was a new govern-
ing structure designed to function as a joint 
decisionmaking body over the shared water 
resources of the West Bank. There were equal 
numbers of Israelis and Palestinians on each 
of the four subcommittees, and the decisions 
were to be made by consensus.
Yet, transfer of people to the JWC from 
the Truman-PCG project was asymmetrical, 
with no Israeli counterparts from the initia-
tive serving at the JWC. Furthermore, this 
time the Israelis did not have a close con-
tact within the JWC from the second track 
 initiative. On the contrary, one of the tech-
nical advisers of Kinarti who was not in favor 
of the Truman-PCG initiative became the 
head of the technical subcommittees in the 
JWC as the counterpart of the  Palestinian 
participant from the Truman-PCG. He par-
ticipated in one of the workshops but did 
not become a permanent participant and 
criticized the initiative for not offering any 
practical idea to improve the water prob-
lem, although he did praise it for bringing 
the two sides together.8 Thus, although the 
Truman-PCG initiative was influential at 
the negotiation and outcome levels, it hardly 
affected the implementation of the agreement 
in this new political structure. The following 
statement by one of the Palestinian official 
negotiators from the Truman-PCG initia-
tive illustrates the  disappointment with the 
Committee:
1994 Cairo and 1995 Oslo II negotiations.4 
It was also due to the increasing influence of 
Shimon Peres, then Foreign Minister, and his 
group on bilateral water negotiations and their 
more accommodating position towards the 
acceptance of the Palestinian water rights and 
joint management of shared water resources 
(Rodan, 1995; Rouyer, 2000).
Within the Labor government there were 
different attitudes towards the water issue 
between the security-defense group close to 
Rabin and the foreign affairs group led by 
Peres.5 The former tended to see water as a 
national security matter and preferred exclu-
sive control by Israel of the shared resources, 
while the latter tended to regard water in more 
economic terms and as a basis for regional 
cooperation. The bilateral water negotiation 
team was headed by an appointee of Rabin, 
Noah Kinarti, known as a hardliner with 
close ties to the IDF, objecting to the joint 
management of shared resources and the rec-
ognition of Palestinian water rights.6
Just before the Oslo II negotiations, 
Kinarti’s power in the negotiations dimin-
ished when he was replaced by Gideon Tsur, 
the Water Commissioner at that time, as the 
head of the Israeli water team. This strength-
ened the position of those in the negotiations 
who favored the idea of joint management. 
Tsur was a water professional advocating 
economically sound solutions to water con-
flict. Also, one of the water professionals that 
he appointed as the head of a water exami-
nation committee was Saul Arlosoroff, an 
influential Israeli participant of the Truman-
PCG initiative.7 Soon after this change in 
4 About this change, see Savir (1998), Rouyer (2000), and 
Rodan (1995).
5 I use these terms for affiliations rather than official posts 
at these institutions.
6 It was reported that Kinarti was ‘willing to torpedo the 
talks over one drop of water’ and he thought ‘Jordanians 
and Palestinians would not get one drop of Israel’s water’ 
(Rodan, 1995).
7 Gideon Tsur appointed the ‘Committee for Examining the 
Management of the Supply of Water in Israel’ in order to 
examine water pricing policies. See Knesset Report (2002).
8 Interview with the concerned Israeli water official, Tel 
Aviv, 2002.
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As in the Truman-PCG initiative, one major 
process input of IPCRI to negotiations is 
improved human capital on the Palestinian 
side. There were several Palestinians who par-
ticipated in multilateral negotiations, having 
acquired data, skills, and new knowledge and 
having built professional relations with Israeli 
water experts through IPCRI initiatives. 
One of the Palestinian ex-officials, who was 
a member of the IPCRI initiatives and the 
multilateral negotiations suggested: ‘People 
who attended the multilateral meetings were 
people we talked with when we were writing 
the [report for IPCRI] …. I think the success 
of [the multilaterals] started with these Track 
Two  meetings.’
During the Netanyahu period, IPCRI 
made some input into the policymaking pro-
cess. IPCRI members had close contact with 
water policymakers and good relations with 
the new Israeli Water Commissioner Meir 
Ben Meir. Their activities during this period 
were mostly limited to troubleshooting of the 
day-to-day problems on water, since there 
were no bilateral negotiations on the issue. 
It was during this time that they organized 
an intervention between the senior water 
officials of both sides to address the daily 
problems with the help of some Israeli and 
Palestinian parliamentarians. IPCRI served 
as an intermediary channel when the official 
track was not moving, especially on practical 
matters. Thus, the input of the IPCRI initia-
tives in the negotiations in the 1990s can be 
considered as more to the process rather than 
the outcome.
Comparative Lessons from the Cases
The outcomes and effects of Track Two 
 initiatives examined contributed to the  process 
of negotiations and  institution- building 
more successfully than the outcome of nego-
tiations in both water and Jerusalem cases. 
There was transfer to the outcome in only 
one water initiative, while in all others there 
If you read Oslo B there is kind of coordi-
nated management and this was influenced 
by our work. The idea was taken from our 
work. They used it in their own way .… It is 
a joint management mechanism, but it is mal-
practiced. The Israelis were doing everything 
one sided. They often came to the Joint Water 
Committee and said approve it.
The consequence of the asymmetrical 
transfer of people to the JWC was negative. 
The functioning of this institution relied 
heavily on trust, even more than the nego-
tiations. The institution in the beginning 
was seen as a success and first step towards 
joint management by the participants of the 
 Truman-PCG initiative. In time, the func-
tioning of the institution was hampered by 
the Israeli vetoes, and problems became com-
mon between the water commissioners and 
the members of the subcommittees (Lein, 
2000: 33). Consequently, Palestinian mem-
bers of the Truman-PCG initiative were frus-
trated to the degree that some of them began 
to question the feasibility of implementing 
joint management. Had there been symmet-
rical transfer of people and trust at the sub-
committee levels of the JWC, perhaps there 
could have been better prospects for coopera-
tion. In fact, a Palestinian member of the 
Truman-PCG initiative and the  Palestinian 
head of the technical subcommittee of the 
JWC thought: ‘If we continued to work with 
people like [a member of the Truman-PCG 
initiative] at the JWC too, the situation could 
have been better.’
As far as the IPCRI initiative is concerned, 
the inputs from the projects in the 1990s to 
the negotiations were in terms of process and 
were mainly through the transfer of profes-
sional people from the Track Two initiatives 
to the multilateral negotiations. Especially in 
the early 1990s, Palestinian participants had 
acquired data, technical skills, and new knowl-
edge through these  meetings, when there 
was no official Palestinian water  institution 
and the Palestinian water community was 
inex perienced compared to the Israeli one. 
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is that even when transfer to outcome is 
not observed, these initiatives have made a 
contribution to the process of negotiations 
that may facilitate a better agreement when 
the conditions for transfer to outcome are 
met. Thus, success of Track Two diplo-
macy should not be defined simply based 
on contributions to outcome, but should 
also encompass the contributions to the 
process. By observing the  contributions 
to the process, one can also capture the 
important but more subtle and indirect 
inputs made by these initiatives (other than 
specific ideas and proposals formulated in 
the initiatives), such as the transfer of skills, 
data, and insights to negotiations and insti-
tutions. For example, one very significant 
outcome of both water and Jerusalem ini-
tiatives was learning obtained by especially 
the Palestinian participants concerning new 
skills, data, knowledge, and, later on, the 
use of these skills and knowledge in negoti-
ations, which all fed into the process. Table 
I summarizes all of the learning outcomes 
reported by the participants of the Track 
Two initiatives in terms of percentages. 
The three  learning outcomes contributing 
to the process of negotiation and policy-
making are discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs.
As seen, all Track Two initiatives served 
as important venues for the Palestinians to 
acquire data and improve their technical, 
were varying degrees of contributions to the 
negotiation and policymaking process.
The most general conclusion that strikes 
one from the comparative study is that 
for  successful contribution to outcome, an 
 effective transfer strategy (i.e. symmetrical 
transfer of people and ideas, besides  contacts 
and  communication with the negotia-
tors) has to be accompanied with openness 
to  outside information in the negotiation 
team, and parallel political preferences in 
the  leadership with the ideas promoted by 
Track Two. Keeping these conditions, or 
constraints, in mind will be useful both for 
practitioners in designing their initiatives and 
 researchers in evaluating contributions to 
outcome. In the case of Truman-PCG input 
to the Oslo II negotiations, all these three 
 conditions were present. For Jerusalem, in 
the  post-Camp David period there was sym-
metrical  transfer from Track Two in addition 
to an  increasing openness to information on 
the side of the  negotiation team that increased 
the  likelihood of  transfer to outcome. Yet, 
political  willingness in the leadership was 
debatable. On other  occasions, such as the 
preparatory period for Camp David, during 
Camp David, and for the JWC, few if any of 
these conditions were met.
Apart from these three conditions affect-
ing transfer to outcome, the comparative 
study highlights a number of important 
 regularities across the cases. The first one 
Table I. Transfer Effects and Outcomes*
Themes Number of workshop participants (%)
 N = 40 (Water = 13, Jerusalem = 27)
 I-W P-W A-W I-J P-J A-J
New learning  83.33  85.7 84.61 87.5 100 92.59
 a. Data and skills 33.3 85.71 61.53 31.25  63.63 44.44
 b. New concepts, insights  83.33 71.4 76.92 62.5  81.81 70.37
 c. Learning about the other side 66.6 71.4 69.23 68.75  81.81 74.07
I = Israeli participants, P = Palestinian participants, A = all participants, W = water initiatives, J = Jerusalem initiatives.
* Since the number of participants is small, the percentages should be read as tendencies rather than as precise statistical 
indicators.
Esra  Cuhadar  T R A C K  T W O  D I P L O M A C Y 653
the transfer of new concepts and insights 
(Table I) which can only be captured by 
looking at the process again. Several of the 
insights gathered from the Track Two ini-
tiatives that could be considered as strategic 
information for the negotiators contributed 
to the process of negotiations and policy-
making. Such knowledge and insights could 
especially be relevant for the policymakers 
and negotiators because they included new 
information on what is feasible in the negoti-
ations or in the joint analysis of the conflict. 
They were offered by the participants in all 
water and Jerusalem initiatives examined, but 
in two occasions – one concerning water, the 
other Jerusalem – their direct contribution 
to the process was observed. In the  Jerusalem 
case, a proposal was brought up during the 
negotiations by the US mediation team to 
divide the Jerusalem issue into three com-
ponents (municipal, political, and religious) 
and to start negotiating with the functional 
and easier issues. The idea of breaking the 
sovereignty concept into three was suggested 
in several Track Two projects and was spe-
cifically formulated in an ECF-ASS Track 
Two initiative by an Israeli– Palestinian 
team, as an innovative and practical way of 
addressing the sovereignty question (Cingoli, 
2001: 13). As indicated by Dennis Ross, the 
ideas he used in his initial proposal at Camp 
David were what he found useful in Track 
Two meetings:
The very concept that we came up with; to 
think about it from a conceptual standpoint 
in three ways as a bureaucratic city that had 
a function, as a religious city that had certain 
needs, and as a political city where there has 
to be sovereignty, some of the disaggregating 
came, not in a very obvious way, from what 
[Track Two groups] had discussed, but it 
informed our thinking. It gave us a handle on 
how to try to develop an approach.9
Similarly, in the water case some of 
the Israeli water policymakers interviewed 
professional, and negotiation skills.  Overall, 
Table I indicates that about 85% of the 
Palestinian participants in water initiatives 
and about 60% of Palestinians in Jerusalem 
workshops reported learning of skills and 
data. Such learning of skills was transferred 
to negotiations when these people partici-
pated in the negotiations. Examples of this 
kind of learning and its contribution to 
negotiations can be seen in the statements of 
two participants:
We [Palestinian participants] considered 
these kinds of meetings as an opportunity to 
exchange information and data. Israelis have 
more knowledge and experience in these areas. 
That was an opportunity for us to receive that 
data because there was no official exchange 
that we could get that data from.
and
These [Track Two projects on water] were 
to us areas where we could draw a lot of ben-
efit from the Israeli experience and build the 
scientific foundation for future Palestinian 
economic development …. Often, what hap-
pened was [these meetings] also developed a 
lot of expertise in the field of negotiations. 
Most of the participants, like [name of a Pales-
tinian from the initiative who participated in 
the official negotiations], did not have exper-
tise in negotiating before. In time, [he] devel-
oped these skills and expertise through these 
projects and workshops.
Although this is not a direct contribu-
tion to the outcome of negotiations, through 
acquisition of skills and data, Palestinian par-
ticipants, especially those who continued to 
the official negotiations were able to interact 
with Israelis on a more equal footing during 
the negotiations and not surprisingly valued 
this learning. In this sense, learning of skills 
and data in the Track Two initiatives empow-
ered the Palestinians by helping them to close 
the gap between the two sides in terms of 
capabilities and skills as well as building the 
capacity of the newly founded  Palestinian 
public and civil society  institutions.
Another more subtle, yet important, 
contribution to the negotiations concerned 9 Interview with Dennis Ross, Washington, DC, 2003.
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In addition to these direct and confirmed 
contributions, more indirect contributions to 
the negotiations are possible as well, such as 
how the publication of the models and ideas 
publicly helped create a discourse and spread 
the legitimacy of some ideas and break taboos. 
However, unlike the direct and observable 
contributions to the process which were con-
firmed by the negotiators interviewed, such 
indirect contributions were not traced sys-
tematically during this research.
As a final contribution to the process in 
terms of learning, the participants were able 
to learn about the other side (Table I) allow-
ing more complex thinking about the other’s 
society and about the sources and dynamics 
of the conflict. This theme came up regu-
larly from both sides in the interviews, often 
intertwined with learning of new insights 
and improvements in relations.
The second major lesson drawn from the 
comparison of two cases is that the transfer 
process is more complicated than thought by 
early practitioners of Track Two. When one 
engages in a comparative assessment, one 
also finds important similarities in this com-
plex process, even if cases that are compared 
belong to two issue areas that seem very dif-
ferent, like water and Jerusalem. In addition 
to the similarities in outcomes and effects 
of Track Two workshops as summarized in 
Table I, another commonality can be found 
in the strategies and tactics used for transfer.
There were mainly four transfer mecha-
nisms used in both water and Jerusalem 
initiatives. These were: (1) exporting key 
influential participants from the Track Two 
initiatives to negotiations and policymaking 
institutions, (2) contacts and consultations 
with decisionmakers and/or official media-
tors, (3) serving as advisers to policymakers 
or negotiation teams, and (4) creating, pub-
licizing, and sending artifacts comprised of 
ideas, maps, and policy recommendations 
for decisionmakers’ attention.
suggested that with the help of the Track Two 
initiatives, their understanding of Palestinian 
water rights as well as the negotiation flex-
ibility of the Palestinians on this issue became 
clearer. The joint learning experience the 
workshop participants went through helped 
them generate new concepts and insights. This 
type of learning contributed to the forma-
tion of a knowledge-based expert community 
across conflict lines, whose members acquired 
similar issue-specific knowledge, a common 
professional language, and a common frame 
of reference regarding the  conflict.
These qualities make this ‘across- the-
conflict-lines’ knowledge-based community 
a human resource that can be drawn upon 
when needed. For instance, as a result of the 
Truman-PCG initiative, Israeli and Palestin-
ian water professionals together generated 
new knowledge and insights about joint 
management of shared underground water 
resources that did not exist before. Likewise, 
in the IPCRI initiatives, participants jointly 
created knowledge on water as articulated by 
an interviewee who later on assumed a role in 
the Palestinian Water Authority:
The big thing about the project was – now 
what everyone quotes it for – the minimum 
water requirement. We were the first ones who 
came up with minimum water requirement 
for domestic use as being equitable between 
Israelis and Palestinians .… People still tell me 
that for those days it was a breakthrough.… 
It was minimalist work, but it was the first of 
its kind.
And on Jerusalem, one participant of the 
 JI-IPCC initiative who attended joint field 
trips noted:
[Field trips to other cities] opened our minds 
to new possibilities which we otherwise would 
not have thought of. For instance, the Swedes 
took us to a city on the Finnish–Swedish bor-
der which decided to unite despite the fact 
that it belonged to two different countries …. 
or cities that are designated for mixed ethnic 
activities.
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David negotiations as an assistant to the 
Chief Negotiator).
This strategy of exporting ideas and 
insights via influential people inevitably 
required a careful selection of participants 
for the initiatives. For this reason, in all of 
the initiatives the groups were mixed, includ-
ing both academics/technical experts and 
politically connected and influential people. 
The strategy was successfully implemented 
in all initiatives even though these exported 
members’ contributions usually remained 
limited to making an input to the process, 
rather than to the outcome.
The second major transfer strategy was 
establishing contacts with decisionmakers 
and/or official mediators. This was used in 
both water and Jerusalem cases. Compared to 
the previous strategy, this one is more indi-
rect and is based on influencing the thinking 
of decisionmakers and negotiators. Contacts 
with decisionmakers and negotiators were 
sometimes initiated by the participants of 
the Track Two project and at other times 
by the third party and the organizer of the 
 initiative. Also, during these contacts, ideas 
and proposals were sometimes introduced by 
one of the sides and at other times by both 
sides. Anecdotal experiences of some orga-
nizers suggest that they were more success-
ful in convincing people when contacts were 
carried out jointly and ideas were introduced 
to key policymakers by both sides. This 
strategy was often used in combination with 
sending artifacts and the strategy of advising 
politicians and negotiators.
A third strategy used was the Track Two 
participants serving as advisers to politicians 
or negotiators without necessarily participat-
ing in the negotiations or serving in the poli-
cymaking institutions. This strategy was used 
on and off by all initiatives, but it became 
systematic especially in the Jerusalem case. 
For example, in the ECF-ASS initiative, a 
month before the Camp David Summit, the 
The mechanisms used by Track Two 
 organizers to transfer ideas and insights in the 
upwards direction were effective in  varying 
degrees. Of these tactics, contacting the  official 
mediators (US peace team) and exporting key 
people to the  negotiations  provided the most 
direct access to the  process and the likelihood 
of direct input into the nego tiations. In this 
sense, holding Track Two initiatives with 
influential people was not an adequate strat-
egy by itself, but rather needed to be accom-
panied by additional actions such as visiting 
official mediators and convincing them, or 
working closely with particular official nego-
tiators and  lobbying to export people from 
Track Two to negotiations.  Furthermore, 
simply including key people in Track Two 
meetings was not  adequate because of the 
asymmetric transfer of people or asymmetric 
transfer of ideas to the upwards level.
In all of the initiatives, exporting par-
ticipants to negotiations and policymaking 
circles occurred and was an important strat-
egy to make an impact. Thus, as was sug-
gested by Fisher (1997), Kelman (1995), 
and Mitchell (1981, 1993), all initiatives 
included key influential people that were or 
could potentially make a direct contribution 
at the policymaking level and were success-
ful in establishing a direct link between the 
Track Two and the negotiations. Some-
times, these people were selected for the 
Track Two project for their already exist-
ing influential role in the negotiations and 
policymaking circles (for example, the Tru-
man-PCG initiative picked influential Pal-
estinian and Israeli water experts who were 
involved either with negotiations or poli-
cymaking), while at other times, the initia-
tives encouraged and sometimes lobbied for 
certain participants to take an active role in 
the negotiations even though initially they 
were not influential or part of the negotia-
tions (e.g. the ECF-ASS initiative that man-
aged to get one of their staff into the Camp 
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of the JWC concerning the Truman-PCG 
initiative and the exclusion of Faisal  Husseini 
from the negotiations concerning Jerusalem. 
An important finding of this study is that 
when transfer is asymmetrical, its effective-
ness is greatly hampered.
Although the asymmetrical exporting of 
people had adverse effects, ideas and propos-
als still found their way to the process even 
when they were asymmetrical, and they were 
still considered in the negotiations, either 
with the help of one of the parties or with 
the help of the official third party. However, 
when people were not transferred to the 
negotiations symmetrically and when only 
one side was open to outside information, 
the likelihood of a contribution to the out-
come by exporting ideas only is still low.
In sum, a comparative look into the con-
tributions of these initiatives to the process 
of negotiations highlights important regu-
larities in the types of learning acquired and 
used by the participants, the strategies used 
to transfer effects and outcomes, and the bar-
riers to effectiveness created by asymmetric 
transfer of people and ideas.
Conclusion and Directions 
for Future Research
The findings reported in this study are cer-
tainly limited to the context of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict. But it is a step forward 
in showing that it is possible to systematically 
evaluate the Track Two efforts. It was found 
that even among two issues that seem to be 
very different (water and Jerusalem), there 
are remarkable similarities in terms of the 
process of transfer: the transfer effects and 
outcomes of the initiatives and the transfer 
strategies used. Moreover, three key condi-
tions appear to affect the successful transfer 
to outcome of the negotiations in both water 
and Jerusalem cases. Research building on 
this and focusing on the process of Track 
Two in other conflict contexts will broaden 
Jerusalem Task Force was created at Orient 
House to develop strategies for final status 
talks based on the ASS work with the ECF 
and to advise Palestinian negotiators. While 
the ECF worked closely with the senior nego-
tiator, Gilead Sher, JI people advised Oded 
Eran, head of Israel’s peace directorate.
A final and less direct mechanism used 
was the sending and publicizing of written 
artifacts. All four of the initiatives produced 
various  written artifacts and sent them to 
 decisionmakers, policymakers, negotiators, 
and sometimes to legislators. Just as involving 
influential people in the workshops alone was 
insufficient, interviewee anecdotes suggest that 
the sending of artifacts, by itself,  too, was not 
adequate to make a contribution to the negotia-
tions. Additional efforts, such as  finding gate-
keepers in the institutions or accompanying 
the sending of artifacts with direct contacts, 
are necessary to increase their effectiveness.
Another important lesson drawn from the 
comparative assessment is concerned with 
the barriers during the implementation of the 
transfer strategies. As discussed so far, often 
the exporting of participants to poli cymaking 
institutions or to negotiations and the  transfer 
of ideas to the process of negotiations occurred 
asymmetrically, meaning that the transfer of 
participants or ideas took place either from 
the Palestinian or from the Israeli side, but 
usually not from both. Thus, the effects and 
outcomes of the Track Two initiatives did 
not necessarily transfer  reciprocally.
In the case of asymmetrical exporting of 
people to the policymaking institutions and 
negotiations, these people usually had to 
interact with counterparts that did not nec-
essarily go through a similar experience. This 
was found to be disappointing and frustrat-
ing for people whose perceptions of the other 
side and the conflict were transformed in the 
workshops. Examples of such frustration and 
the negative effects on the negotiations were 
mentioned (and are narrated in this article in 
the relevant sections) especially in the cases 
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strategies when transfer of people is accom-
plished symmetrically, and whether there are 
any successful cases of transfer to outcome 
when there is lack of political willingness.
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our understanding and help the building of 
theory in this area.
The findings reported in this article sug-
gest that the transfer of effects and outcomes, 
employing primarily the strategy of working 
with influential people and exporting them to 
negotiations and policymaking institutions, 
was achieved more successfully in impacting 
the process of negotiations rather than the 
outcome. Scholars and donors focused pri-
marily on the impact of Track Two on out-
come especially by looking at whether ideas 
have been incorporated into the negotiated 
agreements or not. Such narrow focus misses 
the other important contributions of Track 
Two to the process, such as the contribution 
of Track Two to the improvement of human 
capital, which is valuable for negotiations 
rather indirectly.
Another key point is that the asymmetri-
cal transfer of people, as well as the asym-
metrical transfer of ideas to some extent, 
from Track Two initiatives to negotiations 
and policymaking positions is a barrier to 
effectiveness. Such asymmetrical transfer also 
indicates that Fisher’s proposition: ‘the closer 
the participants are to the decisionmakers, 
the more likely the transfer to official level’ is 
not sufficient as a condition but needs to be 
qualified. Despite the fact that almost all of 
the initiatives involved participants who had 
direct access to the negotiations and policy 
institutions, closeness and direct connec-
tions are not likely to impact the outcome 
when it is asymmetrical. Thus, closeness to 
decisionmakers is not adequate to account 
for transfer to Track One, and the process is 
much more complex, being contingent upon 
additional factors.
While this research took a step in the direc-
tion of assessing transfer from Track Two 
initiatives based on participants’ and policy-
makers’/negotiators’ self-assessment, much 
remains to be done in this area. Future research 
needs to trace what kind of transfer effects and 
outcomes occur and through what types of 
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